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FURTHER COMNENTS ON INSTRUNENTALS
by
Richard J. Leskosky
0. Introduction
In his 1968 work on instmmGntal adverbials Lakoff provided a
number of arguments for the position that the two sentences
la) Seymour sliced the salami with a knife,
lb) Seymour used a knife to slice the salami.
must have the same deep structure rather than the separate structures
usually postulated at that time:
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His contention was that the single structure underlying the two
sentences would necessarily have to be more abstract than the
representation of deep structure subscribed to by Chomsky or else
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the conditions used to characterize this latter concept of deep
structure would have to be abandoned.
The rejoinder from the group of linguists supporting Chomsky's
2position appeared in an article by Joan Bresnan the following year.
Bresnan attacked a number of points in Lakoff 's analysis of the in-
strumental adverbial construction and maintained that the deep
structures of the two forms of the adverbial were in fact distinct.
This paper is intended as a rebuttal to Bresnan 's article.
Rather than recapitulate all of Lakoff 's arguments as well as
Bresnan 's I shall deal directly with the latter 's objections and
alternate explanation of the similarity between the two forms and
discuss only those of Lakoff 's arguments sp>ecifically attacked in
Bresnan 's article.
1.0 Objections to Lakoff 's arguments
1.1 Lakoff cites the following sentences to demonstrate that
NP2^NP3 is a constraint common to the two sentence forms.
3) I scratched the wire with a knife.
4) I used a knife to scratch the wire.
5) *I scratched the wire with (it ).
(itself)
6) *I used the wire to scratch itself.
Given structures 2a and 2b, Lakoff notes that the ungrammatical
sentences above would have to be ruled out by the following constraints
A) the object of the preposition in an instrumental phrase
cannot be identical to the direct object of the main verb
B) the object of use cannot be identical to the object of
the verb in the complement sentence following use
.
According to Lakoff these strange constraints occur nowhere else in
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English grammar and their correspondence in these constructions is
stranger still if their deep structures are essentially different.
In his view a correct grammatical analysis would express the two
above constraints as a single constraint.
In an attaunpt to counter this argument Bresnan cites the
"for-dative" as a construction which demands a constraint between
the object of the verb and the object of a preposition:
7) Seymour called me a porter. (=Seymour called a porter for rae)
8) *Seymour called me myself. (=*Seymour called me for myself)
9) Seymour brought Harry a concubine.
10) *Seymour brought Harry himself.
(=*Seymour brought Harry for himself)
She points out that in this respect instrumentals and datives behave
the same, "arc strikingly different from other phrases, and surely
must be treated in special ways. " As an example of this special
treatment she offers another exceedingly strange rule to the effect
that the antecedent of an oblique noun phrase in a verb phrase must
lie outside that verb phrase ("operate across a verb").
There arc, however, two points which can be made against this
position.
1.1.1 First, although the dative and the instrumental may be strik-
ingly different from other phrases they are also strikingly different
from each other and for Bresnan to categorize them together under
this same constraint leaves her open to the same charge of overgener-
alization that she lays against Lakoff.
The dative but not the instrumental can undergo the Dative
Shift Transformation. Thus
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11) Seymour called me a porter.
12) Seymour gave me a salami sandwich,
can be derived from
13) Seymour called a porter for me.
14) Seymour gave a salami sandwich to me.
but when an analogous transformation is performed on la the result
is the unacceptable
15) *Seymour sliced a knife the salami.
This difference leads in turn to a further difference between
the two constructions—namely, the dative (once it has undergone
Dative Shift) can be passivized but the instrumental (that is, the
instrumental in its with form) cannot.^ Thus
16) I was called a porter by Seymour.
17) I was given a salami sandwich by Seymour.
can be acceptably produced, whereas the following sentence would be
ruled out since it could not have met the structural description re-
quired for passivization to occur:
18) *A knife was sliced the salami by Seymour.
Lastly, the instrumental also hAS the constraint thAt the subject
cannot be identical to the oh-iont nf •n-.o ^^^*^ _ ^ . .i-u m Djec or the xnstrumental preposition:
19) *Henry broke the window with himself.
The dative, on the other hand, has no such constraint, as evidenced
by sentences like
20) Seymour bought a book for himself.
21) Seymour bought himself a book.
1.1.2 Second, even if Bresnan is allowed to generalize about the
dative and the instrumental as similar structures obeying a similar
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constraint, it can nevertheless be argued that a more abstract inter-
pretation of the dative explains the phenomenon at least as effectively
as Bresnan's oblique object constraint yet does so in accordance
with a constraint already needed in the grammar. Specifically, the
constraint in the for
-
dative sentences which Bresnan cites could be
explained by the presence of an underlying verb benefit so that the
deep structure of 7 would be something like
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Benefit belongs to that class of verbs (like murder , kidnap , assassi-
nate , and use ) which cannot take an object identical to the subject.
Sentences like 8 and 10 would then be ruled out on the grounds that
23) *I benefit myself,
is ungrammatical.
1,1.3 Bresnan's attempt to use the dative to defend her idea of deep
structure only militates against that concept in the end, for if
the dative and the instrumental are to be taken as operating under
the same constraint this can be meaningfully done only within the
context of a more abstract notion of deep structure wherein both
instrumental and dative would be derived from underlying verbs.
1.2 Bresnan offers as partial counterevidence to Lakoff's argument
the fact that there are many dialects in which
24) Seymour used a knife to slice the salami with.
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is acceptable. This is taken to indicate that la may be embedded
in lb. If such were the case, Bresnan points out, some similarities
in co-occurrence relations and selectional restrictions between the
two sentences would be expected (namely, those Lakoff pointed out).
On the other hand, differences like those Bresnan claims between
the sentences would also be possible.
This argument could be dismissed with the assertion that it
was not such a dialect Lakoff was describing, A more honest and
meaningful approach to the problem is forestalled by the lack of
further data on the dialects mentioned- -for example, whether the
with is an optional or an obligatory constituent of the structure
and whether it is fully acceptable or only marginally so. It could
be suggested, however, that the redundant with is purely a surface
phenomenon which occurs because of a mistaken ainalogy made by the
speaker on the basis of sentences like
25) Seymour brought a knife to slice the salaimi with,
1.3 The most serious allegation Bresnan levels against Lakoff 's
argument is that his claim about tht synonymity of the two instru-
mental forms is false. Given theoretical assumptions current in
1968-69, if two sentences have the same underlying structure they
arc necessarily synonymous. If their underlying structures are
different, it is not necessary that they have the same meaning; and
Bresnan holds that one could expect some differences in meaning in
this case since one deep structure contains the additional morpho-
logical material use while the other does not. She offers the fol-
lowing examples of such differing selectional properties as support
for her claim that la and lb have different deep structures.
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26a) All at once Seymour broke the door open with a bat.
27a) Seymour finally managed to open the door with his penknife.
28a) Seymour rapidly sliced the salami with a knife.
are respectively not synonymous with the following doubtful sentences:
26b) ?A11 at once Seymour used a bat to break open the door.
27b) TSeymour finally managed to use his penknife to open the door.
28b)??Scymour rapidly used a knife to slice the salami.
This problem arises from the fact that if these two instrumental
forms have the same underlying structure it must be such that it can
allow eithet the use S or the +ACriVITY S to appear in surface struc-
ture as the primary S with the otiier S embedded immediately below
it--that is, either use or the +ACriVITY verb may command the other,
but they cannot command each other simultaneously. The problem is
further complicated by the fact that when use --the underlying verb--
becomes embedded in such a structure it appears in its prepositional
form with
.
As Bresnan pointed out, use and slice (or any other verb which
is +ACriVITY) obviously have different selectional restrictions.
The differences between the a and the b forms of 26, 27, and 28
which she ascribes to the "peculiar selectional properties" of the
"additional morphological material" use in the use versions are ac-
tually due to the differing properties of whichever verb it is that
commands the other in the respective sentences. That is, in the
sentences given by Bresnan if use is chosen in deep structure to
command slice , break , or open it in turn is immediately commanded
by another verb (taking the surface form of either a verb or an
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adverb). The selectional r^estrictions of these higher verbs
would prevent the appearance of a verb like use in the next S
below them, as evidenced by the unacceptability or dubious accept-
ability of
29)??A11 at once Seymour used a bat,
30) ?Seymour finally managed to use a penknife,
31) ?Seymour rapidly used a knife.
Therefore, the b versions of 26, 27, and 28 are unacceptable be-
cause use cannot meet the selectional requirements of the higher
verb. In the sentences where the +ACriVITY verb commands the under-
lying use it is the +ACTIVITY verb which must meet the restrictions
of the higher verb in order for the sentence to be acceptable. In
the a^ versions of the above sentences this condition has obviously
been met, and the sentences are acceptable.
Thus, Bresnan is only partially right in her analysis. The
unusual properties of use are responsible for the unacceptability of
26b, 27b, and 28b, but not becauseroftthe mere presence of use but
rather because of its position in the deep structure aaid because of
the filtering selectional requirements of the verb above it.
2,0 Bresnan 's alternate system
2.1,1 Bresnan next attempts to show the superiority of her own
system by providing an alternative explanation for the phenomena
discussed by Lakoff, the first such instance being those examples
showing that an instrumental cannot be embedded in another instru-
mental. "For this class," she asserts, "there is crucial evidence-
showing that instrumental adverbs must be syntactically defined in
9deep structure rather than transformationally derived,
"
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Lakoff relates t.h^ iil-formedness of sentences like
32) *Hcnry broke the window with a chisel with a hammer.
to the nonoccurrence of the instrumental reading for sentences like
33) *Henry used a hammer to use a chisel to break the window.
Bresnan notes that Lakoff gives no motivation for the nonoccurrence
of the latter type or sentence and then goes on to state that these
facts are only superficially related, that Lakoff 's is a false gen-
eralization. She holds that there are limitations on the number
and kind of adverbial phrases associated with any given verb and
that it moreover is necessary to subcategorize verbs for lexical
insertion on this basis. Verbs that take instrumental adverbials
she calls "I^-type verbs. " Apparently there are no verbs which
take more than one instrumental, and this fact is expressed in the
Lakoff-rejected theory of deep structure by the Phrase Structure
Rules which provide for only one Instrumental Adverbial per VP.
Since use and a number of semantically related verbs (for example,
employ
. and utilize ) cannot take "oblique objects of the appropriate
kind" (that is, instrumentals) they are not to be considered j^-type
verbs. This I^-type verb category is supposedly useful in explaining
the fact that when uso has a verb-phrase complement the embedded
verb must be an _I-type verb (provided that the complement is the
type under discussion here). Bresnan calls this "Condition I. "
Since use is not an I^-type verb it cannot fulfill Condition I^ and
so cannot complcmentize itself—in other words, sentences like 33
are ruled out.
2.1.2 Bresnan 's argument continues along these lines, but this
serves as a convenient point to pause and raise a number of objections,
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First, if all verbs are subcategorized on the basis of the
kind and number of adverbial phrases they take, then there must be
a set of M-type verbs that take varying numbers of manner adverbials,
T-type verbs that take certain time adverbials , D-type verbs that
take durative adverbials, and so on indefinitely, since every time
a new type of adverbial is distinguished from the rest all verbs
must be subcategorized with respect to it. Correspondingly, there
must also be Conditions M, T, D, and so on indefinitely, added to
the grammar to explain similarities parallel to those exhibited by
the instrumental construction discussed here.
All these listings of verbs according to the kind and number
of adverbials that they take is no doubt satisfying to certain types
of researchers interested in taxonomies, but it reveals nothing
about grammar and in fact beclouds the issue. Mere listing provides
no meaningful generalizations. Moreover, the degree of overlap of
these verb categories is high in the extreme and again provides no
insight but only further confusion.
Second, assuming that Bresnan's ideas about l^type verbs and
Condition I^ were correct, she still could not account very well for
the non-existence of the with phrase in the S embedded immediately
below the use S. In other words, although only j[-type verbs can
appear as embedded immediately under use-verbs they nevertheless
cannot take in this situation the adverbial which qualifies them as
I^-type verbs. In her earlier discussion of sentences like 24 she
suggested by way of explanation that la may actually be embedded in
lb. Here in her discussion of rcsultative clauses (those embedded
immediately below use ) one can see the point of her earlier mention
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of the dialect phenomenon. Given this sort of structure (that is,
la embedded in lb) the identical NP naming the instrument in the
embedded S can be deleted through some sort of identity-deletion
condition. But this does not account for the non-existence of
sentences like
34) *Seymour used a hammer to break the window with a chisel.
Here Bresnan must rely upon certainly the strangest of all the
strange constraints she defends--an identity constraint between
the direct object of the main verb and the object of a preposition
in an embedded S.
Third, although Lakoff gives no motivation for the rton-
existence of sentences like 33, there is a reasonable constraint
which accounts for this phenomenon and which is needed for other
verbs as well. Most verbs do not tolerate an embedding of an
identical verb immediately below them whether the subject of the
embedded S is the same as or different from the subject of the main
S as, for example, in
35) *Seymour sliced the salami to slice the bologna.
36) *Seymour sliced the salami for Alvin to slice the bologna.
Other verbs can be embedded as complements to themselves with
either an identical or a different subject in the embedded Sj
37) I forced Earl to force Tom to marry my ugly sister.
38) I forced myself to force Tom to marry my ugly sister.
Finally, there is a class of verbs which cannot be embedded as
complements to themselves when the subject of the embedded S is the
same as the subject of the main S but can when the subjects are
different:
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39) Alvin expected Carl to expect him to arrive at six.
40) *Alvin expected himself to expect to arrive at six.
41) *Alvin expected to expect to arrive at six.
42) I supposed Fischer to have supposed himself to play chess better
than Pctrosian.
43) *I supposed myself to have supposed Fischer to play chess better
than Petrosian.
Use is simply a member of the first and largest of these groups and
cannot be embedded under itself as a complement, this constraint,
which applies to most verbs, accounts for the nontexistence of sen-
tences like 33. Given Lakoff's system, this also accounts for all
cases in which instrumentals within inStrumentals are unallowable.
5.2.1 &resnan classifies the S embedded below use as a "resultative
clause" but gives no syntactic characterization of it. Her Condi-
tion I_ "specifies that the result of using an instrument must be
12
something that it is possible to do with an instrument." Verbs
like know arc not I^-type verbs and would violate Condition I^ if
they were embedded below use -verbs. This would explain the non-
existence of sentences like
44) *Seymour used a slide rule to know the answer.
Bresnan goes en to try to demonstrate the necessity of having a
Condition I^. Condition I^, as mentioned above, demands that verbs
embedded in resultative clauses below use must be I^-type verbs,
Lakoff's constraint demands that these verbs be +ACriVITY. Bresnan
cites a number of verbs like consider which are +ACriVITY but not
I^-type verbs. That consider is +ACTIVITy is evidenced by the ac-
ceptability of sentences like
45) I forced John te consider the alternatives.
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46) I was considering becoming a beekeeper.
But consider cannot be used in instrumental sentences , as in
47) *I used (a book ) to consider it.
(my mind )
(a computer)
48) *I considered it with (a book ).
(my mind )
(a computer)
To Bresnan this demonstrates that Condition J[ accounts for data
which Lakoff s theory cannot account for and so is more acceptable.
The necessity of having a Condition 1_ to explain the above data
then justifies a nonsemantic characterization of instrumentals.
2.2.2 I find, however, that Bresnan's supposed counterexamples
(specifically, the behavior of the verbs she cites) actually form
an argument of their own for the semantic characterization of in-
strumentals and for other structures as well.
Certain verbs presuppose or subsume certain instrumentations
in their meaning. Thus, the following sentences spoken with normal
intonation and stress are semantically unacceptable (or, at best,
exceedingly strange) because of the redundancy caused by the presence
of the instrumentals.
49)??I strangled Seymour with my hands.
50)??I used my hands to strangle Seymour,
51) *The dog bit John with his (mouth).
(teeth)
52) The dog used his (mouth) to bite John.
(teeth)
53) ?Bill shot John with a gun,
54) ?Bill used a gun to shoot John.
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55) *I (heard ) the concert wiih my ears.
(listened to)
56) *I used my ears to (hear ) the concert.
(listen to)
The above sentences are redundant since the verbs themselves in
unmarked or unspecified usage convey all the relevant information
about the instrumantation used:
57) I strangled Seymour,
58) The dog bit John.
59) Bill shot John.
60) I (heard ) the concert.
(listened to)
Instrumcntals of both forms can appear with these verbs if they
specify further or mark the instrument, as evidenced by the perfect
acceptability of the following.
61) I strangled Seymour with (that ghastly tie of his).
(only my left hand )
62) I used (that ghastly tie of his) to strangle Seymour.
(only ray left hand )
63) Grandpa bit the dentist with (his one good tooth ).
(his new store teeth)
64) Grandpa used (his one good tooth ) to bite the dentist.
(his new store teeth)
65) Bill shot John with a blunderbuss.
66) Bill used a blunderbuss to shoot John.
67) I listened to the concert with both ears.
68) I used both ears to listen to the concert (and didn't pay any
attention to Clarissa's prattle).
All these sentences specify the particular type of the general instru-
ment presupposed (for example, blunderbuss, a particular type of
gun) or mark it as being not the expected instrument (strangulation
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using a neck tie instead of bare hands, for instance). Sentences
like
69) I strangled Seymour with my own hands.
70) I heard it with my own ears.
are examples of an intensification marking analogous to the inten-
sive reflexive in sentences like
71) I strangled Seymour myself.
72) I heard it myself.
Just as bite presupposes teeth and strangle presupposes hands
as instrumentation in the unmarked state, so do Bresnan's +ACriVITY,
-I^ verbs presuppose the mind in general, some particular mental
process, or the vocal apparatus as instrumentation. The difference
is that the instrumentation in these latter cases is of a more in-
alienable nature and the alternatives are extremely limited (if
they exist at all) or only figurative. In fact, her -I^ verbs can
take instrumentals in certain marked cases like the following
73) She considered (accepting) his proposal with her heart rather
than her brain.
74) She used her heart rather than her brain to consider (accepting)
his proposal.
Finally, Bresnan's inclusion of a book and a computer in her
sample sentences which appeared here as 47 and 48 can really have
no bearing on her argument since these sentences would be semsintically
anomalous in the same way
75) *Bill shot John with a knife.
is semantically anomalous.
2.3.1 Bresnan offers a final proof for the necessity of a Condition
I^ by citing a set of verbs with two senses, one +ACriVITY but not
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I^-type and the other +ACHIEVEME1T and 2[-type. Examples arc swim
.
run , climb :
76) *I forced Harry to use a breast stroke to swim.
77) He uses special racing shoes to run. (=in order to) '
78) He was (forced to use Marvel crampons toclimb. (=in order to)
This set of sentences shows the impossibility of using an instru-
mental with the first mentioned sense (+ACriVITY,
-_!) of these
verbs, while such a possibility with the Second sense (+ACHIEVEMENT,
-I^) is demonstrated in the following sentences.
79) He used a breast stroke to swim the Hellespont
i
80) He plans to use special racing shoes to run the race.
81) He used Marvel crampons to climb Mt. Everest,
Bresnan obviously takes this as proof that her Condition I^ is ex-
plaining data that Lakoff 's -•ACTIVITY constraint cannot account for.
2.3.2 Eschewing the subject of the underlying status of the objects
of her +ACHIEVEMENT verbs and of the validity of the above structures
as actual instrumentals , one can still point out a major flaw in her
argument. As she demonstrates the two categories -••ACTIVITY and
-ACHIEVEMENT they are not mutually exclusive; in fact, -ACHIEVEMENT
not only does not imply -ACTIVITY --which would be the case if they
were mutually exclusive--but rather entails -t-ACTIVITY. Thus,
-ACHIEVEMENT verbs are actually a proper subset of -ACTIVITY verbs.
All Bresnan has shown is that not all senses of all +ACriVITY verbs
can be embedded below use -verbs. She has shown Lakoff 's discussion
of instrumentals not to be in error but merely to be somewhat too
general in one minor aspect. Even this minor flaw is done away
with, however, when one considers that Lakoff 's constraint i6 that
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verbs embedded as verbal complements to use must be +ACTIVITY and
not that all +ACTIVITY verbs must be able to be embedded as verbal
complements of use . Thus, the last of Bresnsn's objections to
Lakoff's article is done away with.
3.0 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that Bresnsn's arguments against
Lakoff's treatment of instrumcntals can be answered and her own
assertions handled more simply and economically withlh the framework
of Lakoff's ideas on the same subject. Hopefully, this has also
produced some additional argumehts for a more abstract notion of
deep structure.
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